

when it didn't. "The country's allies and clients became accustomed to demanding continued American support in meeting the problems and threats that confronted them" (276). Beyond Europe, policymakers were chided not to "draw a color line on freedom" (272).

A Sense of Power is a deft, literary, and persuasive analysis of America's twentieth-century evolution from the world's largest neutral nation to its most interventionist. Coming from a British observer and a historian of the Progressive Era who brings a fresh eye to foreign policy, it is more piquant and original than the title suggests. Of course, even this soft sell of American idealism will meet resistance from traditionalists who believe material explanations vanquish all others, including those advocates of the empire thesis who present their theory as fact. Yet books like John Thompson's *Sense of Power*, Frank Ninkovich's *Global Republic*, and my own *American Umpire* reveal a thirst for interpretations that take greater account of the trends of the past century, in which empires lost legitimacy, nation-states replaced colonies, arbitration blossomed, humanitarian intervention swelled, and war between countries declined dramatically—all goals to which the United States dedicated resources and lives. Why did America do so? According to John Thompson, because it cared.

Review of John Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders: Deception at the United Nations in the Quest for Palestine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016)

Daniel Hummel

As most diplomatic historians will acknowledge, diplomats and policymakers are often willing to mislead each other if it serves the interests of their states. John Quigley, a scholar of international law at Ohio State University, seeks to define cases of diplomatic "deception" among Israel's founding generation—Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Abba Eban. In a short 240 pages, he provides a narrative of Israel's diplomacy at the United Nations that is anchored in the period between 1940 and 1967. He uncovers, through archival material from the UN and other sources, episodes in which Zionist and Israeli leaders deceived, misled, or spun events on the ground to their advantage.

Quigley's most intriguing argument is that early success by Zionists created "a developing operational ethic that falsehood was justifiable" in certain situations (160). The language itself is striking. The new state was learning through trial and error, like a child, how deception could produce positive results. This argument leads Quigley to some impressive contributions, especially in reframing the Soviet-Zionist relationship in the 1940s, but the argument is both problematic and underutilized. Many questions remain unanswered. How did such an ethic become institutionalized? When and why did this ethic reach its limits? Essentially, some of the basic questions that diplomatic historians ask are left unanswered. Quigley's approach to the material as a legal scholar contrasts starkly with the concerns of diplomatic historians.

The bulk of Quigley's analysis involves two of the original and ongoing issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee crisis. On both issues, Quigley documents the strategies of Zionist

and Israeli diplomacy and the ways in which key founders were less than forthcoming with information or downright misleading. Quigley is building upon the work of the New Historians in Israeli historiography (Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé), who have been presenting critical accounts of Israel's founding since the declassification of documents from the 1940s. He also draws on more recent scholarship by Avi Raz and John Judas, among others, who cast a similarly critical eye on more recent and more thematically diverse issues. Quigley is extending this approach into the realm of international diplomacy and especially into the arena of the United Nations.

Certainly, Quigley has uncovered some dramatic and interesting examples of his key claim about deception. Most striking are 1) The ways in which officials from the Jewish Agency, a key Zionist organization that helped form Israel's first government, framed problems in Palestine to the uninformed UN Special Committee on Palestine (which led to the UN plan of partition in 1947); 2) the claims by Israeli leaders (especially Ben Gurion) that Palestinian Arab civilians were fleeing Palestine not because of Israel Defense Forces provocations but because they were told to by Arab leaders; and 3) Israel's unfounded assertion, repeated for years by Abba Eban, that Egyptian forces attacked Israel on the morning of June 5, 1967 (in fact, the Israeli cabinet voted to begin operations the day before). These examples, each of which has had lasting effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, are given more significance in Quigley's history because of the way they shaped diplomacy at the United Nations. In each case, Israeli diplomats were able to cause enough confusion or dissension about the basic facts on the ground that the UN was neutralized and did not interfere with Israel's state interests.

However, some of Quigley's examples of "deception" are less convincing. For example, he recounts how in 1948, Shabtai Rosenne, the Jewish Agency's chief lawyer, explained publicly that the Arab League's invasion of Israel on May 15, 1948, was to stop the creation of the Jewish state (93). Quigley disapprovingly notes that Rosenne neglected to mention that the Arab League also wanted to stem the tide of Palestinian expulsions. The more effective strategy was clearly to focus on the Arab League's existential threat to Israel—hardly a notable

example of deception. In another instance, Quigley quotes copiously from Henry Kissinger's glowing description of Abba Eban. Eban treated anti-Zionism and antisemitism as inextricable, and he privileged "protecting the Jewish people" over "accuracy" (137). In this and other examples, it is unclear exactly when hard diplomatic bargaining ends and the titular "deception" begins.

These ambiguous cases are crucial because they expose the blurry line between international norms in diplomacy and deception that most historical actors dance around and that intersects with each of the more significant cases described above. What is the definition of deception, and what is the significance of identifying cases of deception in international diplomacy? Quigley does not explicitly explore these questions or identify the boundary between diplomatic license and deception, even as his case hinges on its transgression. This vagueness is compounded by Quigley's use of numerous verbs and descriptors to characterize the actions of Israel's founders. They commit acts that range from "portraying [Israel's] actions and aims in terms that show Israel in a favorable light" (6) to "paint[ing] a rosy picture" (27) to promoting "pure fiction" (52). They are guilty of "distortion" (147), "dubious assertion

of facts" (233), "lying" (234), and "prevarication" (235). This last term is used throughout Quigley's final chapter and apparently means something different from "deception." The point here is not to morally excuse Israel's actions here but to pin down an analytical category of what actions count as deceptions.

This problematic language should not detract from the insightful contributions of *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders*. One of Quigley's most compelling arguments is about the decisive role that the Soviet Union played in aiding Zionist goals. The USSR gave the Jewish Agency and the early state of Israel more diplomatic cover in the United Nations than the United States did. As Quigley tells it, before 1946 Soviet intentions for Palestine were unclear, but in the decisive years between 1947 and 1950, the Soviet Union became a dependable ally of the Zionist movement. It was the USSR, which was more amenable to population exchanges than Britain, that Chaim Weizmann increasingly gravitated toward in the 1940s (33). It was the Ukrainian representative to the UN, Dmitri Manuiliski, who first referred to Israel as a state at a UN meeting (98). It was the Soviet representative, Yakov Malik, who argued against blaming Israel for the refugee crisis in 1948–49 (114). Quigley argues that Soviet support for Zionism was premised on "promises made to the Soviet Union" by Moshe Sharret, David Ben Gurion, and other Zionist leaders (99). The promises included Ben Gurion's assurance that Zionism was a socialist movement and that the interests of the new state of Israel would align with those of the Soviets. Though Israel was committed to a policy of "non-identification" and ostensibly distanced itself from both the USSR and the United States in the late 1940s and 1950s, even Soviet diplomats quickly realized that the state was tilting toward the West. It is unclear to what extent the attempt to convey impartiality was a Zionist strategy of intentional misdirection (or deception), a product of unanticipated developments, or a combination of both.

Ultimately, Quigley leaves both the historical and moral significance of his study under-articulated. It remains unclear if Israeli leaders were in any way uniquely deceptive, or if they were simply better at ordinary diplomatic duplicity than other leaders. Quigley shows the early success Israel enjoyed at the UN, especially in gaining crucial support from the Soviet Union. That success might imply a peculiar affinity for deception. Yet he readily states that "Israel is far from the only country to invent facts to advance its interest in international diplomacy" (233). He also quotes David Ben Gurion's biographer as saying that Ben Gurion believed that "under certain circumstances, it was permissible to lie for the good of the state" (161). But the evidence he presents cannot speak for itself.

Any discussion of deception has a moral dimension, as does virtually every aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In both the first and last pages of the book, Quigley discusses the Hebrew term "hasbara," which literally means "explanation" but has come to be used to characterize the state of Israel's public diplomacy strategy. Depending on one's point of view, hasbara can refer benignly to Israel's official explanations of its actions, or it can mean to "give a false explanation for actions and policies for which there is no valid justification" (1). Quigley implicitly sides with the critical judgment, but it is unclear what the implications of his position are. Does Zionist deception undermine the legitimacy of the state of Israel? Or does it, more modestly, demand Israeli correctives to the official record? Does it influence contemporary negotiations over a two-

state solution? These and other issues of significance are left unaddressed. It is unclear if the metric of morality is Quigley's primary measuring stick, though the term "deception" seems to indicate that it is.

Review of Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015)

Jeffrey Crean

Having existed for close to a generation, the new Cold War history is by now anything but new. These days, thanks to path-breaking works by scholars such as Odd Arne Westad, Matthew Connelly, Piero Gleijeses, and Lien-Hang Nguyen, the multinational, multi-archival approach to investigating major topics in the field is commonplace and in fact expected. Yet while some recent works of international history have been illuminating, many utilize their pioneering research either to confirm notions long suspected by expert observers or put forth poorly argued insights which fail to live up to the works' intimidating bibliographies. Featuring research from archives in ten countries on five continents, Jeremy Friedman's *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* has the requisite intimidating bibliography. But it also presents and proves novel arguments on an important subject frequently alluded to but rarely dealt

with in depth by previous scholars. Friedman argues that the Third World rivalry of the two great communist powers was rooted in their differing conceptions of revolution based upon divergent formative experiences and ideological traditions. Descending from the class-centered milieu of nineteenth-century European socialism, the Soviets developed an anticapitalist paradigm of global revolution that emphasized economic transformation. Emerging during a period when their nation was repeatedly attacked and assiduously exploited by foreign powers, Chinese communists, by contrast, had an anti-imperialist vision of revolution prioritizing national autonomy. When the anti-imperialist approach proved more useful in postcolonial environments, the Soviets felt compelled "to adopt the Chinese revolutionary agenda," winning the competition at great expense in both resources and credibility (14).

Focusing mostly on the 1960s, Friedman begins with Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power in 1956 and concludes with Mao Zedong's death two decades later. While touching upon events in Latin America, Friedman looks primarily at Africa and South Asia. As the post-Stalin USSR turned its focus away from Europe, a group of area studies experts known as *mezhdunarodniki*, or "internationalists," used their rare knowledge of regions to which the regime had previously played little attention to influence and guide policy (18). In *The Global War*, Westad emphasizes the part played by such experts in the late 1970s. Friedman makes a valuable contribution by highlighting the role of an earlier generation of Soviet scholars. Guided by the *mezhdunarodniki*, Soviet efforts in Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s concentrated upon large-scale economic development and the rapid development of heavy industry. But outlays of considerable human and financial capital, first in Guinea, then in Mali, and then to a lesser extent in Ghana, proved fruitless as local political and military leaders soon severed ties in order to protect their own personal power.

In addition, Khrushchev's stated policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States made the Soviets appear